University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2005

Do Different Types of Hospitals Act Differently?
Jill R. Horwitz
University of Michigan Law School, horwitz@law.ucla.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/45

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Nonprofit Organizations Law Commons, Social
Welfare Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Horwitz, Jill R. "Do Different Types of Hospitals Act Differently?" Law Quad. Notes 48, no. 2 (2005): 94-7.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

d

By Jill R.Horwjtz
Thefollowing is based on testimony delivered before the

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means
on M y 26,2005

M

r. Chairman, in its review of the tax-exempt sector,
this committee has heard many distinguished witnesses
discuss the legal requirements governing nonprofit organizations,
the advantages that come with nonprofit status, and whether
nonprofit organizations provide sufficient public benefits to j u s q
these advantages. These are particularly important questions far
the hospital industry, where for-profit, nonprofit, and government
hospitals operate side by side.
I will discuss two questions about the implications of the
mix of hospital types: First, do different types of hospitals act
differently?Second, are there sigdicant competitive issues raised
by having different hospital types competing in the same market
together?

Medical service provision
Underlying many of the policy questions about the legal
treatment of nonprofit hospitals is one basic issue: Do they act the
same as for-profit hospitals -and if not, what are the differences
and are they big enough to matter?
There are good reasons to expect hospitals of different
ownership status to act alike. They all share common goals of
treating sick people; they all employ large numbers of doctors and
nurses, using medical technology; they contract with the same
employers and insurance companies, and are subject to the same
health care regulations. Superficially, they resemble each other so
much that a patient admitted to a hospital is unlikely to be able to
tell whether it is a for-profit or a nonprofit.
However, whether you find differences between nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals depends on where you look. Most studies

of hospital ownership have examined financial meamre's, and
have found little difference among hospital types. For example,
research has shown that nonprofits d for-profit hospitals are quite
similar in their costs, sources of capital, exercise of market power
and adoption of certain types oftechnology. Although for-profit
hospitals pay higher wages and offer incentives to top managers,
nonprofits are increasingly using performance-based pay as well.
Finally, during the early 1990s, for-profit hospitals and nonprofits
had similar margins, although for-profit margins were higher than
those of nonprofits by the late 1990s. There is some evidence that in
the most recent years the average nonprofit hospital had a negative
income pm~admission,
while the average for-profit had a positive
income per admission.
Such financial tneasures, however, provide an incomplete picture
of a hospital. Because they are first and foremost providers of care
for the sick and injured, to evaluate whether nonprofit hospitals earn
their keep we must also know how hospitals differ in the medical care
they provide.
In my research on medical services, I have found large, Bystematic, and long-standing differences among hospitalltypes. For-profit
hospitals are more likely than their nonprofit counterparts to offer
the most profitable services, and less likely than either nonprofits
or government hospitals to offer services that are unprofitable yet
valuable, even essential.
I will offer a few examples. Psychiatric emergency care is
considered an extremely unprofitable service, both because of
low reimbursements and because its patients tend to be poor and
uninsured. Comparing hospitals that are similar in terms of size,
teaching status, location, and market characteristics, for-profit
hospitals were seven percentage points less likely than nonprofits
and 15 percentage points less likely than government hospitals to
offer psychiatric emergency services.
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Compare these results to open heart surgery, a service so
profitable that it is often referred to as the hospital's "revenue
center." For-profit hospitals are over seven percentage points more
likely than similar nonprofit hospitals and 13 percentage points
more likely than goverpent hospitals to provide open-heart
surgery.
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Perhaps what is most striking about for-profit hospitals is
how strongly and quickly they respond to changes in financial
incentives. The best illustration of this comes from a set of postacute care services, such as home health care and skilled nursing
services, whose profitability changed sharply over time. These
services became highly profitable in the early 1990s, then reversed
and became less profitable with the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. All
three types of hospitals increased their offerings of home health
care when it became profitable, but for-profits did so to a striking
degree. From 1988 to 1996, the probability of a for-profit hospital
offering home health services more than tripled -from 17.5
percent to 60.9 percent. During the same period, nonprofit and
government hospitals increased their investment at a much lower
rate (nonprofits went from 40.9 to 5 1.7 percent, government

ti

hospitals went from 38.1 to 5 1.9 percent). When these services
became unprofitable, for-profits were also quick to exit the
market, roughly five times quicker than nonprofits.This finding
provides evidence that for-profits move quickly and strongly in
response to financid incentives.

the question of wh&er nonprofits p-de
duable benefit9
to society. First, if the mix of medical serviqes available in a
commdty is strongly
by the profitability of the
services, dhis is potentially wMisomc for all patients -rich
and poor, insured and &wed.
Patients need what they need,
aepending on their medical condition, not ~nthe pr!ce of a
seryice. Even rich and insured patien& sometimes.need iqvl- '
'
that are unprofitable for hospitals to offer.
As I noted above, noqprofits an more likely to o a r a trauma
center than br-profit hospigs with similar characteristiics. One
hopes never to be in a serious car crash. But s u r v i ~ r s more
likely close to a trauma center if the accident takes place just
outkide a nonprofit hospital.
Second, extreme respons,ive~&sto h c i a l incentives a n be
quite costly to the government. M d m e spendhg per patiept
and increases in s p A g rates a r e k h r in for-profit hospital
markets than others. (SE~
E. Mmmmn, J. Skinner, and E. Fisher,
'The Association Between k=-&fitHospital Ownership and
Increased Medicare Spmdmg," New ~ n g l r j & u r n d$Medicine,
341, no. 6 [1999]: 420.)This can be explained by investments
such as home health. For example, duringthat period of ramped
up provision of home hdth care services, home h d t h visits per
Medicare beneficiary increased by nearly a factor of seven, aod
services b d o o d . Government spendmg
payments for
on post-ac u e went &om three percent of Medicare hospital
payments to 26 percent. This kcrease was not patients getting,
better care, but hspitals doible-dipping -receiving two reimbursements for the same treatment.
Perhaps more troubling is evidence that the relative respomiveness to finand incentives has led to fraudulent billing through
a practice known as "up-coding." Up-coding occurs when a
hospital BhikS a patient's clmpsis to one that receives higher
reimbursement from Medicare. k r example, a hospital v y
label a case of pneumonia as a case of pneumonia with conplications, at increased cost to the government of about $2,000 per
discharge. Although all types of hospitals have done tbis,for-profit
hospitals have done this more than nonprofit hospitals. (See E.
Silvnman and J. Skinner, ''Medime Up-coding and Hospital
Ownership," J o w a l o f H c P h Economics 23 [2004]: 369-389.)
Moreover, up-codmg is co+giow. Nonprofit haspitah are more
likely to up-code when they have for-profit hospital neighbors
than when they do not.
As a final point on differences in hospital behavior, let me say a
word about charity m.Over the past 50 years, the legal require-
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In sum, for-profit and nonprofit hospitals act quite
differently. For-profit hospitals are considerably more responsive
to financial incentives than nonprofits, not just with respect to
their decisions to offer services but also in their willingness to
operate at all. Under financial pressure, for-profit hospitals are
more likely to close or restructure than nonprofits.
The most important aspect of these findings is that nonprofits
are more willing than for-profits to offer services even though
they happen to be unprofitable. These services include not
just psychiatric emergency care, but also child and adolescent
psychiatric care, AIDS treatment, alcohol and drug treatment,
emergency rooms, trauma services, and obstetric care.
There are a few clear implications of these finchgs for
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menu for nonprofit hospitals seeking tax exemption hnn inmkin& shifted from mmow requirements that hoapihLs r e k
poverty to broader demomtm.tiom of chitable benefit.Yet,
public attention to the provision of what ie called ucharitablecare"
ha^ remained mbust.Whetha nonprofit and for-prdit hospitals
m e r in their prwision of charity r u e is daficult to say -in
large part because what is typidly meamred is o v d u n o m pensated care. Uncompensated care provided by hospitals represents items that most of us would not consider charitable.These
include bills left unpaid by patients who have the ability to pay
or d(sc0unts to insurance companies.Given these measurement
dSculties, credible evidence shows that hospital types do not
differ much in the provision of uncompensated care. Even these
results are hard to interpret because for-profit hospitals locate
in relatively better-insured areas. My main point in disrarsing
charity care is thittalth0ugh free care for those who are unable to
afford it is important, other Merences -in services, in quality,
in medical innovation -are valuable to all members of society.

Hospital competition
Do nonprofit hospitals have anti-competitive effects, or
represent unfair &&petition to for-profits? The arguments
about competition boil down to the idea that the nonprofit tax
exemption is either unfair or distortionary. An older gGeration
of research claimed, fpr example, that the tax exemption gives
nonprofits an extra financial boost that makes it di.Ecult for forprofits to compete. Newer research has dismissed this notion by
demonstrating that income tax exemptions do not lower input
prices. Furthermore, as an empirical matter, if there were anticompetitive effectswe would not see mixed markets with both
for-profit and nonpmfit'hospitds, but we do.
Some argue that nonprofits are less efficient than for-profits
and are able to stay in business because they use their surpluses,
including tax savings, to offset higher production costs. This idea,
too, has little foundation. In determining whether an o r e tian is efficient, it is centrally important to answer the question
"&cient.at what?" For-profits are more efficient at earning
profits. In the hospital sector, we care about efficiency in providing
health care. Overall, empirical evidence Jhows no appreciable
differences in efficiency at providing health care between forproft and nonprofit hospitals.
A M idea is that tax savings lead nonprofits to produce
too many goods of too little value. That is, nonprofits use their
financial savings to lower costs and. therefore, patients will buy

too much health care. This argument implies that the health care
provided by nonprofit hospitals is too cheap. The idea that h d t h
care is too inexpensive is generally not of great concern, particularly when annual medical inflation rates are back on the rise at 4
percent per year.
The best evidence shows that nonprofit hospitals, rather than
using their financial savings to offset inefficient management
or lower prices to drive for-profit competitors out of business,
provide unprofitable and essential services that are valuable to
society.These come not only in the form of more valuable medical
services like trauma care, but also in training physicians and
nurses. It is the vigorous competition among nonprofit hospitals
that has produced virtually all the medical innovations on which
we rely. Imagine where we would be without the first smdlpox
vaccination developed at the nonprofit Harvard Medical School or
the first brain surgery at Johns H o p h . We can thank nonprofits
for robotic surgery, pacemakers, artificial skin, kidney transplants,
and new technology to save premature infants. Finally, along with
the competition among nonprofit hospitals, having for-profits in
the mix provides another dimension of competition, competition
between organizational types.
An important lesson of the research I have summarized today
is that what you find depends on where you look. If you look at
financial behavior, you will find few differences that j,ustifytax
exemption. If you look at m e d i d treatment, you will find some
striking differences of the sort that need to be included in any
thorough discussion of nonprofit benefits.
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